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Fostering Environmental Regulation? Corporate Social Responsibility in Countries with 
Weak Regulatory Capacities. The Case of South Africa
Jana Hönke/Nicole Kranz/Tanja A. Börzel/Adrienne Héritier
Abstract
The engagement and influence of multinational business in the developing world and in coun-
tries in transition is often highly contested. With regard to their environmental impact, there has 
been ample evidence for business taking advantage of situations of weak environmental regu-
lation and the devastating effects thereof. More recently, however, certain efforts to counteract 
such tendencies have emerged with voluntary standards in the context of transnational norms 
of corporate social responsibility. Our research takes a closer look at the interaction of such vo-
luntary CSR norms and public regulation in countries with limited regulatory capacities. In fact, 
we ask a rather bold question: Do multinational businesses that are subscribing to international 
CSR norms also actively promote such standards in countries in which they operate? Looking 
at the situation of environmental governance in South Africa and taking the mining as well as 
the food & beverage industry as examples, this paper seeks to answer two questions. First, are 
companies who have subscribed to voluntary environmental standards actually engaging in fos-
tering collective environmental regulation and under which conditions? And second, if they do, 
which schemes of engagement prevail: do companies engage in fostering collective regulation 
rather via the state, private self-regulation or in forms of public-private co-regulation?1
Zusammenfassung
Das Engagement und somit auch der Einfluss multinationaler Firmen in Entwicklungs- und 
Schwellenländern sind oftmals umstritten. In Hinblick auf umweltschädliche Auswirkungen 
gibt es vielfältige Belege dafür, dass Firmen schwache staatliche Regulierung im Umweltbereich 
ausnutzen; häufig mit verheerenden Folgen. Im Rahmen von freiwilligen CSR-Standards sind 
in letzter Zeit zunehmend Anstrengungen unternommen worden, um solchen Entwicklungen 
entgegenzuwirken. In unserer Recherche untersuchen wir das Wechselspiel freiwilliger CSR-
Normen mit öffentlicher Regulierung in Ländern begrenzter Staatlichkeit. Wir gehen dabei von 
folgender Frage aus: Fördern multinationale Unternehmen, die sich zu internationalen CSR-
Normen verpflichtet haben, diese Standards auch aktiv in den Ländern, in denen sie operieren? 
Anhand der Situation im Bereich Umweltpolitik in Südafrika und beispielhaft anhand der Berg-
bau-, und Lebensmittelindustrie sollen zwei Fragen beantwortet werden: Erstens, bringen sich 
Firmen, die freiwillige Umweltstandards unterzeichnet haben, aktiv in die Förderung kollektiver 
Umweltregulierung ein und unter welchen Bedingungen? Und zweitens, falls sie dies tun, wel-
che Modelle setzen sich durch: engagieren sich Firmen durch Einflussnahme auf den Staat, 
durch private Selbstregulierung oder in Formen öffentlich-privater Koregulierung? 
1 The paper results from the joint research project of the European University Institute Florence and 
the FU “Fostering regulation? CSR in countries with weak regulatory capacity” as part of the Collabora-
tive Research Centre (SFB) 700 “Governance in areas of limited statehood”. The project is supervised 
by Prof. Adrienne Héritier (EUI Florence) and Prof. Tanja A. Börzel (FU Berlin), research associates are 
Jana Hönke and Nicole Kranz (FU Berlin) and Anna Müller-Debus and Christian Thauer (EUI Flor-
ence).
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1. Introduction2 
The	engagement	and	influence	of	multinational	business	in	the	developing	world	and	in	coun-
tries in transition is often highly contested. One of the core arguments of the critics of an 
increasingly globalized economy is that, faced with less stringent and consistent regulation 
in countries with weak regulatory capacity, corporations in many cases capitalize on lax en-
forcement with regards to social as well as environmental standards. Countries will abstain 
from sanctioning such behaviour in order to avoid threatening further investment, thus getting 
caught in a ‘race to the bottom’, leading to the further degradation of natural resources and the 
compromising of social standards for the sake of potential economic growth or rather the at-
traction of short-termed foreign investment (Chan/Ross 2003; Altvater/Mahnkopf 2002). While 
there has been ample evidence for business taking advantage of this situation and the devasta-
ting	effects	thereof,	more	recently	certain	efforts	to	counteract	such	tendencies	have	emerged.	
International voluntary programmes and standards promote responsible business practice and 
have been widely adopted by multinational business. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is 
increasingly high on corporate agendas nowadays and while the comprehensiveness and the 
degree of compliance with CSR norms remain a critical question, they are part of an emerging 
global governance structure, which an increasing number of large, multinational companies 
(MNCs)	can	no	longer	afford	to	ignore	(Risse	2007).
The	question	emerging	from	these	two	observations	now	pertains	to	the	effect	of	such	stan-
dards in the areas where companies operate. While compliance with standards should certainly 
result in the limitation of negative impacts from business operations in the absence of adequate 
national legislation, our research takes a closer look at the interaction of voluntary CSR norms 
and state regulation. In fact, we ask a rather bold question: Do multinational businesses that 
are subscribing to international CSR norms also actively promote such standards in countries 
in	which	they	operate?	Can	we	detect	a	fostering	effect	on	regulation	driven	by	multinational	
business,	 for	example	 in	 the	health	and	environmental	policy	field,	 in	countries	with	rather	
weak regulatory capacities? 
This research, while acknowledging the largely negative environmental impact of business in 
areas	of	limited	statehood,	thus	seeks	to	identify	positive	examples,	where	spill-over	effects	of	
international CSR norms on host country environmental regulation have occurred. In a second 
step, we will then take a closer look at the conditions and the modes under which multinational 
firms	contribute	to	the	creation	of	public	regulatory	capacity	and	the	raising	of	environmental	
and	health	regulation,	taking	into	account	both	–	factors	explaining	firm	behaviour,	and	public	
actors’	 reactions.	During	a	first	 research	phase	 the	project	 is	developing	a	set	of	hypotheses	
capturing	these	interactions,	varying	conditions	at	the	company,	sector	and	policy	field	level	in	
the context of a single country case study, South Africa.3 
2 We wish to thank Thomas Risse, Andreas Nölke and the participants of our paper presentations in the 
context of the SFB 700 as well as the CONNEX Workshop on “Private actors as norm setters” at TU 
Darmstadt (01.-02.07.2007) for helpful comments.
3 For further details see the project description on www.sfb-governance.de/csr.
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This paper focuses exclusively on the company perspective and is a summary of preliminary 
insights	 regarding	 the	 environmental	 policy	 field,	 drawing	 on	 empirical	 evidence	 from	 the	
mining and food & beverage industries.4	Focusing	on	South	Africa	as	our	first	case	study,	we	
discuss the dynamics of weak public regulation and CSR against the background of a transition 
country which has gone through a major regime change with the abolishment of apartheid in 
1994,	not	only	redefining	the	political	sphere,	but	to	a	great	extent	also	the	way	business,	natio-
nal and multinational, operates in the country.
Acknowledging	the	specific	situation	in	South	Africa,	we	investigate	whether	and	if,	how	com-
panies engaging in environmental self-regulation at the company level in the context of CSR, 
also promote forms of collective environmental regulation. In departing from the more en-
compassing approach of the project in the context of the SFB, which investigates regulatory 
changes induced by responsible company behaviour, this paper thus seeks to answer the fol-
lowing two questions:
(1) Are these companies actually engaging in fostering collective environmental regulation and 
under which conditions?
(2) Which schemes of engagement prevail in the context of weak statehood: do companies con-
tribute to a fostering of collective regulation rather via the state, private self-regulation or in 
forms of public-private co-regulation?
Drawing	on	our	first	empirical	 results,	we	 identify	a	number	of	 factors	which	contribute	 to	
explaining	company	behaviour	in	this	regard.	Our	findings	are	based	on	an	extensive	study	of	
the available secondary literature, a press review and primary sources such as annual reports, 
government documents and a number of interviews with experts, key companies and govern-
ment representatives in South Africa during 2007.
In	the	following	we	first	define	central	concepts	and	introduce	an	analytical	framework	to	cap-
ture	the	range	of	governance	actor	constellations	through	which	spill-over	effects	of	MNCs	on	
their regulatory environment may occur. Second, we set the empirical scene by pointing out the 
specific	nature	and	challenges	of	the	environmental	policy	field	within	CSR,	the	specific	context	
of corporate environmental responsibility in a transition country with weak regulatory capacity 
such as South Africa and give an overview of the public regulatory environment in particular 
with	regard	to	its	capacity	deficits.	Against	that	background,	we	identify	in	a	third	step	our	set	
of cases, i.e. companies that qualify as “CSR-company” for the purpose of our study, and present 
a mapping of forms of environmental governance in which companies take part and the extent 
to which incidents of “fostering regulation” occur. Finally, we discuss several hypotheses that 
explain incidents of pro-active engagement of companies in collective environmental regu-
4 See Börzel/Héritier/Müller-Debus (2007) for a similar endeavour with regard to the regulation of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic.
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lation. We conclude with comments on the challenges and limits of voluntary CSR norms as 
functional equivalent to hierarchical forms of steering in weak states.
2. Terms and References 
The SFB 700 “Governance in areas of limited statehood” sets out to investigate whether and 
under which conditions collective goods are provided in a context in which the institutional 
characteristics of statehood are not fully available. For the purpose of this research endeavour, 
limited statehood	is	defined	with	regard	to	deficits	in	one	or	both	dimensions	of	statehood	as	
conceptualized by Max Weber: the legitimate monopoly on the use of force in a given terri-
tory,	and	the	capacity	of	state	agents	to	effectively	enforce	political	decisions	therein	 (Weber	
1921/1980: 29 cited in Risse/Lehmkuhl 2005). By contrast governance refers to “the entirety of 
co-existing forms of collective regulation of societal issues” (Mayntz 2004: 66; Risse/Lehmkuhl 
2005; for a discussion see Draude 2006; Risse 2007, own translation), and refers to institutiona-
lised	structures	and	rules	which	provide	for	the	provision	of	collective	goods.	Defining	limited	
statehood narrowly with regard to the institutional characteristics of state agencies (Milliken/
Krause 2002) allows investigating a broad range of state and non-state actors and modes of coll-
ective regulation to provide collective goods. 
In this context, the project ‘Fostering regulation?’ mainly investigates the contribution of pri-
vate self-regulation in the form of voluntary CSR-norms on public regulation but also takes 
effects	on	collective	private	self-regulation	into	account.	Private	business	actors’	role	in	public	
regulation is analysed under the condition of a state with weak regulatory capacities. By weak 
regulatory capacity we mean both, non-existing or minimal national regulation of negative 
external	effects	of	industrial	production,	and	non-existing	or	minimal	administrative	capacity	
to enforce existing regulation” (Börzel/Héritier 2005: 9). Our case selection with regard to the 
companies	considered	is	therefore	limited	to	those	firms	which	have	adopted	a	significant	le-
vel of voluntary global standards or elaborate programs in a certain issue area that exceed the 
requirements as mandated and enforced (!) in the host country. 
In	this	paper,	we	provide	a	mapping	of	when	and	how	firms	engage	in	collective	environmental	
regulation	that	extends	their	internal	environmental	governance	efforts	and	attempt	to	explo-
re evidence for when and how such engagement contributes to a fostering of environmental 
regulation. We thereby intend to test the claim that companies do seek to foster collective en-
vironmental	regulation	and	try	to	identify	factors	from	our	empirical	findings	that	contribute	
to such behaviour. We also analyse which scheme of collective engagement companies choose. 
For the latter, we draw on the governance literature to apply an analytical framework that allows 
for the mapping of collective regulatory activities of companies which takes the whole range of 
public, public-private and private self-regulation into account (Börzel 2005; Börzel/Risse 2005; 
Risse/Lehmkuhl 2005).
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Table 1: Participation of business in collective regulation – actor constellations

















The involvement of industry in public regulation takes place through regular and formalised sta-
keholder consultations at the national, provincial and local level. In such a framework, companies 
may provide their expertise as regards technical procedures. Also, companies may engage in im-
proving administrative capacities to implement a policy. In addition, we take lobbying through 
companies for a fostering of public environmental regulation into account. Public-private co-
regulation refers to situations in which business is involved in the public policy making and 
implementation process as an equal partner. Business is not only consulted by public actors but 
engages in negotiating policies in a formalised framework or engages in public-private partner-
ships. Three possible actor constellations of public-private co-regulation are distinguished in 
this paper, bi-partite co-regulation by public and industry actors, tri-partite negotiation systems 
which involve public actors, industry and labour, and multi-stakeholder arrangements composed 
of	public,	industry	and	not-for	profit	actors	(NGOs,	Community-based	Organisations	[CBOs])	
as well as, optionally, trade unions. Forms of collective regulation without public involvement 
are referred to as private self-regulation. Companies may cooperate with NGOs or CBOs (non-state 
stakeholder involvement), engage in horizontal self-regulation via a business association or seek to 
regulate other businesses vertically along the value chain. 
We will use this framework to indicate in which forms of collective environmental regulation 
companies	are	involved	according	to	our	first	empirical	evidence	from	South	Africa.	To	deter-
mine whether such involvement, as described above, actually entails a component of fostering 
environmental	regulation,	we	still	need	to	define	our	understanding	of	fostering.	Generally,	a	
fostering of regulation has occurred, when either norms and procedural prescriptions improve, 
approaching international standards, i.e. new general or procedural norms are introduced or 
tightened in particular as regards precision and obligation (Abbott et al. 2000), or the imple-
mentation capacity or scope of a policy or service delivery is improved through the contribution 
of material, human or knowledge resources (Chayes/Chayes 1995; Jacobsen/Brown Weiss 1995). 
With	regard	to	our	initial	definition,	we	need	to	distinguish	two	potential	forms	of	fostering	
regulation through companies. In a narrow or strict sense any hypothesis would only be con-
firmed	if	companies	are	the	driving	force	and	environmental	regulation	is	improved	due	to	the	
explicit initiative and demand by companies. In a broader sense, however, we also consider the 
contribution	of	firms	to	an	improved	regulation	that	has	been	initiated	by	either	the	state	or	
civil society. 
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After setting the scene of CSR in a transition country such as South Africa, in the next section, 
part four will map two sectors, mining and food & beverage, with regard to the engagement of 
”CSR	firms”	in	schemes	of	collective	environmental	regulation.
3. Setting the Scene
3.1 Corporate Environmental Responsibility in Developing and Transition Countries




the OECD world. Corporate responses in terms of corporate environmental performance that 
have emerged here at the national as well as the international level include environmental ma-
nagement systems aiming to achieve regulatory compliance through organisational measures, 
certification	and	monitoring	schemes	to	monitor	compliance	and	many	other	hybrid	 forms	
combining various approaches. 
The track record of business in developing countries with regard to its environmental impact 
has been mixed at best. There is a myriad of examples of corporate malpractice leading to 
the exploitation of natural resources, environmental degradation and negative environmental 
externalities oftentimes including incidences of environmental injustice compromising the 
development potential of local communities. Such impacts derive from operations of domestic 
as well as foreign businesses. In the context of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) the academic 
discussion has long been dominated by the discourse on pollution havens. This argument pos-
tulates that investors prefer to invest in countries with lower costs of complying with environ-
mental regulations. Countries, particularly in the developing world, seeking to out-compete 
others for foreign investment in order to enhance economic development will set environmen-
tal	standards	below	the	socially	efficient	 level	or	 fail	 to	enforce	these	 (Neumayer	2001).	Such	
regulatory environments would then attract foreign investment and lead to increased pollution 
levels.
While the pollution haven line of argument could only be validated to some extent, if only 
due to lack of evidence, the concept marks an important starting point for the expansion of 
the academic debate on the interplay of business and environmental regulation in developing 
and transition countries. More recent contributions call for the broadening of the concept to 
include not only a wider range of industry sectors and potential environmental damages bey-
ond emissions but also “the linkages between global trade and investment and environmental 
regulation” (Clapp 2002: 12). Under this approach, not only the behaviour of international busi-
ness in terms of locating operations is considered, but also the interaction with host govern-
ments aimed at lowering or relaxing environmental standards moves to the centre of attention. 
Furthermore, with the emergence of the concept of sustainable development in the 1980s, the 
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multi-faceted role of the (international) business community in advancing development rose to 
attention,	thus	broadening	the	scope	of	analysis	of	firm	behaviour	in	these	contexts.
Taking into consideration the corporate as well as the regulatory dimensions, the question 
emerges around the ‘how’ and thus basically asks what CSR in the (South) African context should 
and could look like (Visser et al. 2006). Certainly, companies operating in developing countries 
or	emerging	economies	are	faced	with	a	set	of	challenges	which	is	fundamentally	different	from	
those	in	the	‘developed	world’,	as	one	finds	different	production	and	operating	conditions	in	
the context of political boundary conditions often characterised by the blending of formal and 
informal institutions and a weak shadow of hierarchy (Börzel 2007; Draude 2006; Engelbrekt 
2002; Schlichte 1999).
3.2 CSR in the South African context
The present day discourse on corporate responsibility and the interplay of various actors in 
the South African context is closely related to the role of business during the apartheid era. 
Dominated by white Afrikaner business, the South African corporate sector during apartheid 
was based on an exploitative as well as highly segregate system of forced labour, which initially 
was supported by foreign investment and later subject to trade sanctions in the wake of South 
African isolationism. Concerning the role of business in the democratisation and reconcilia-
tion	period,	conflicting	interpretations	exist.	More	liberal	writers	claim	that	business	through	
admitting black workers into semi-skilled positions, the removal of workplace segregation and 
the support of urban reform contributed to the process of overcoming apartheid. This claim 
is supported for a small group of companies in a recent publication by Lynham et al. (2006), 
in which they speak of “remarkably progressive actions of a few business leaders in helping to 
bring about South Africa’s transformation to democracy”. Other research indicates that through 
its very own behaviour, business - in pursuit of stabilizing existing regimes to provide for a re-
liable operating environment and due to its deep entrenchment with the political elites by way 
of subsidies and tax-payments as well as other linkages - has been a powerful conservative force 
for the apartheid regime (Fig 2005). 
During the time of transition, business was extremely apprehensive to anything which might 
bring about substantial or radical economic change, such as large-scale redistribution schemes, 
and was closely monitoring and lobbying the transitory and new government to refrain from 
such measures. The example of the two successive macro-economic strategies issued by the 
new democratic government, which were shifted to an approach more favourable of business 
interests	(reflected	in	the	GEAR	[Growth,	Employment	and	Redistribution]	programme	of	1996	
as opposed to the Reconstruction and Development Programme RDP of 1994) might be an in-
dication for this. 
Albeit continuing to carefully monitor the new developments, business has come to view the 
current operating environment as much more favourable than during apartheid. It should be 
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noted that business was never truly held responsible for complicity in human rights abuses 
or	any	other	malpractice	under	 the	official	 reconciliation	process	 (Bezuidenhout	et	al.	 2007;	
Fig 2005). This historical background sets the scene for the notion of corporate responsibility 
among South African businesses today. In many instances the population’s perception of large 
corporations is dominated by mistrust and suspicion due to their entrenchment with the apart-
heid regime.5
Isolated from the global economy before, only since the end of the 1990s a trend towards a 
more proactive engagement of companies to reduce their negative environmental impact has 
taken on momentum. On the one hand, the opening of the South African market has led to an 
increase in FDI. Also, the major South African Industry conglomerates reintegrated into the 
global economy and expanded their operations to other countries which exposed the indus-
try to transnational environmental standards and CSR norms. On the other hand, the African 
National Congress (ANC) government, in its attempt to re-enter the international community, 
developed an elaborated environmental legislation companies were confronted with.
In contrast to many other African countries, South African companies and academics engage in 
a profound discourse on CSR and related issues, which is comparable to those of the interna-
tional business community in Europe and North America (Hayes 2006). A 2005 study by KPMG 
on all 154 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) shows that South African 
companies are ‘global leaders on CSR’, in terms of reporting regarding social issues, although 
they tend to be less advanced in relation to environmental matters.   
For the past years, the South African approach to CSR has been dominated by activities referred 
to as Corporate Social Investment (CSI). This term relates to charitable projects that are mostly 
external to the core business activity and in most cases serve the purpose of creating a positive 
image of the company among stakeholders. The term furthermore conveys that willingness 
among	business	to	address	malpractices	committed	during	the	apartheid	era	and	to	offer	re-
dress to victims, e.g. of human rights violations, is quite limited. When considering corporate 
spending	for	development	purposes	as	a	popular	tool	for	deflecting	possible	criticism,	recently	
conducted surveys for South Africa showed that the overall amount spent on CSI projects is 
considerably low, thus demonstrating the gap between what companies claim to do and their 
actual practices (Hamann/Kapelus 2004). In general, environmental issues are relatively low on 
any CSI or CSR agendas of South African businesses (Hayes 2006). 
However, widely advocated and accepted practices in environmental management such as a 
full life cycle approach, i.e. the consideration of environmental impacts during the entire value 
chain, are currently applied by a number of transnational corporations operating in South Afri-
ca and are increasingly adopted by a number of South African companies as well. Alternatively, 
companies have engaged in the introduction of environmental management systems, for exam-
5 Interview with Director/Centre for Sustainability in Mining and Industry, Johannesburg, South Af-
rica, 16.03.2007; Interview with Environmental Adviser/Chamber of Mines, Johannesburg, South Africa, 
16.03.2007.
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ple in the framework of the international ISO 14001 standard series, which aid in documenting 
a company’s environmental performance over the entire production process. Others refer to 
best	practice	guidelines	for	improved	environmental	management	developed	for	a	specific	in-
dustry, which are mostly issued by the respective government department in charge.
Among the main proponents and forerunners in the establishment of such management prac-
tices have been those companies with international links, i.e. subsidiaries of western MNCs and 
South African global players6 or so-called depatriated companies7 which chose to be listed at 
foreign stock exchanges. These companies are faced with the need to comply with global repor-
ting standards and to meet requirements from the international investors’ community. Global 
initiatives such as the Global Compact or the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) are currently 
receiving heightened attention by the corporate community. The South African King report8 
endorses the Global Sullivan Principles and the ISO 14001; Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) 
certification	as	well	as	the	Responsible	Care	Initiative	of	the	chemical	industry	are	also	popular	
among South African businesses.
South African businesses are increasingly engaging in associations and initiatives, which aim 
at advancing responsible practices in the private sector. These do not exclusively address envi-
ronmental management practises, but in many cases cater to the full range of ethical business 
behaviour. One of the more visible associations is the Sustainable Futures Unit (SFU) of the 
National Business Initiative (NBI). One of SFU’s projects is for example targeted at mitigating 
the	effects	of	climate	change	through	working	on	energy-efficiency	programmes	with	industry.	
The Social Responsibility Index of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (FTSE/JSE SRI), which 
is modelled after sustainability indices managed by the New York or London stock exchanges 
(Dow Jones Sustainability Index, FTSE4Good) and currently comprises about 51 companies, i.e. 
one third of the companies listed on JSE, is another example for industry-driven approaches.
Particularly with regards to issues of environmental injustice pressure has also been exerted 
by an increasingly alert activist community comprising numerous organizations and NGOs. 
The	NGO	community	in	South	Africa	is	relatively	and	effectively	employs	a	number	of	diffe-
rent strategies, such as lobbying, campaigning, capacity-building and increasingly litigation to 
point	to	corporate	malpractice.	They	have	also	been	an	important	force	in	joining	efforts	with	
other civil society groups, such as trade union branches and community-based organisations 
(Lund-Thomsen 2005). The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) 2002 in Jo-
hannesburg has been a driving force for the corporate accountability agenda, linking local with 
international debates and struggles (van Alstine 2007).
6 Examples here are Sasol (petrochemicals), which has spread into Europe, the US and the Gulf region; 
Sappi and Mondi (pulp and paper), which are active in the US and Europe; and Eskom (utility) and 
MTN (mobile telephony), which are more oriented towards investment in Africa.
7 Examples are SA Breweries (SAB Miller), Anglo American, BHPBilliton, Dimension Data, Old Mutual 
and Liberty Life.
8 Named after the King Report on Corporate Governance (King II). This document was issued in 2002 
by the Institute of Directors, which is an association of top management executives providing training 
and other support services (King Committee 2002).
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3.3 The public regulatory environment
The South African government has developed an ambitious and far-reaching environmental le-
gislation since the mid-1990s. With the help of international experts, NGOs and IOs the transi-
tion period has been used by the new government to adopt world-class environmental policies, 
surely to be understood in the context of the attempts by the new government to reintegrate 
South Africa into the international community. 
In	the	field	of	environmental	policies,	therefore,	a	first	glance	at	South	Africa	reveals	a	surpri-
singly far-reaching and well developed environmental legislation. Recent environmental policy 
development in South Africa (i.e. post 1994) was shaped by national as well as international 
drivers.	While	pre-1994	policies	 in	South	Africa	were	not	beneficial	 to	 the	majority	of	South	
Africans,	after	1994	considerable	efforts	were	undertaken	to	provide	for	more	equity.	As	a	con-
sequence, the most fundamental legal provision, the Bill of Rights, Chapter 2 of the Constitu-
tion of South Africa (No. 108 of 1996) proscribes a fair and sustainable management of South 
Africa’s natural resources through the promotion of ownership and empowerment of the peo-
ple.	Specifically,	Section	24	of	the	Bill	of	Rights	guarantees	environmental	rights	to	all	people	
of South Africa. These foundations have provided the starting point for the development of an 
encompassing environmental policy and promulgated the development of rather ambitious 
national policies, strategies, action and implementation plans in order to ensure compliance 
with international accords.
Currently, the environmental policy arena is constituted by a number of legal provisions, which 
for the most part evolved during the past ten years providing for guidance on a wide variety of 
environmental challenges and issues. The National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) 
(Act 107 of 1998 amended by Act 56 of 2002, Act 46 of 2003, Act 8 of 2004) is the central document 
in South African environmental law. It is intended to provide for a co-operative framework 
of environmental governance by establishing principles for environmental decision-making, 
defining	 the	scope	of	actions	of	 the	 institutions	 in	environmental	policy	and	advocating	an	
integrated approach to environmental management. The Act furthermore details compliance 
and enforcement mechanisms, the provision of environmental information and foresees the 
incorporation of international environmental instruments in the South African policy context. 
Other	acts	detail	legislation	in	specific	policy	fields,	such	as	air	quality,	water	management	or	
biodiversity,	against	the	background	of	the	NEMA.	Of	specific	relevance	for	all	industry	sectors	
is legislation on environmental impact assessments (EIA) and licensing for operations.
The	weakness	of	the	South	African	state	mainly	lies	in	its	limited	capacity	to	effectively	regulate	
its	territory	in	certain	policy	fields,	in	particular	in	the	field	of	environmental	regulation	and	
the combat of crime. South Africa’s weak regulatory capacity pertains both, to the lack of spe-
cification	of	these	norms,	and,	most	of	all,	its	capacity	to	implement	and	enforce	them.	Much	
less documented than the legislative basis, evidence for the status of implementation can be 
collected	from	several	official	documents	and	other	non-governmental	sources.	One	can	obser-
ve	different	levels	of	implementation	between	national	and	provincial	levels.	Particularly	with	
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regard to the issue of environmental justice, legacies from the past have not been overcome 
yet and many black communities remain underprivileged in terms of exposure to pollution 
hazards as well as inadequate access to basic services and infrastructure. In many cases, the old 
structures have managed to pervade new legislative approaches. To a large extent implementa-
tion	deficits	are	mainly	attributed	to	two	factors	(DEAT	2000):
(1) Vertical and horizontal fragmentation: The confusing, complex and sometimes contradictory 





with regard to environmental matters as these counteract the original priorities of their mini-
stries. For example, the department charged with the industrialization of agriculture was also 
charged	with	regulating	the	use	of	pesticides,	fertilizers	and	genetically	modified	organisms.	
The department in charge of the promotion of mining and energy is also supposed to mini-
mize and regulate the environmental impacts of this sector. It has frequently been noted that 
companies	in	many	industries	are	subject	to	several	different	pieces	of	legislation,	which	are	
administered	by	different	government	departments.	While	a	radical	and	all-encompassing	re-
structuring process of the DEAT and the cooperative governance mechanism was initiated in 
1998, full deployment of the new systems is still underway (Lund-Thomsen 2005).
(2) Limited administrative capacity: Institutional capacity at the national level, but even more at the 
provincial	level	is	severely	hampered	by	the	loss	of	experienced	staff,	lack	of	budgetary	support	
and the lack of procedures for a broader involvement of the public in environmental decision-
making.	Consequently,	while	policies	are	devised	at	the	national	level,	they	cannot	be	effectively	
applied and enforced at lower government levels (Rampedi 2006). Lack of budgetary support 
is	prevailing	at	all	levels	of	environmental	governance	in	South	Africa.	By	2002	DEAT	signifi-
cantly reduced its budgetary allocation for pollution prevention and control, while the budget 
for tourism was increased. This budget shortage is mirrored by institutions at lower levels 
(Lund-Thomsen 2005). Administrative procedures, such as the process leading up to an EIA are 
lengthy and the joint responsibility of both, national and provincial government institutions 
(Groenewald 2005), resulting in challenges of coordination outlined above.
Many	firms	 are	 largely	 reluctant	 to	 comply	with	 legislation,	 as	 enforcement	 is	weak.	At	 the	
same	time,	the	state	has	not	confronted	those	firms	due	to	the	fear	of	causing	job	losses	and	
disinvestment. While environmental management systems have been introduced during the 
past years, they have not necessarily led to a change in day-to-day business practices. For the 
least part, companies strive to be in compliance with regulations to the degree they are actually 
enforced	by	the	government.	It	is	claimed	that	the	coordination	of	different	requirements	by	
different	departments	often	translates	into	considerable	costs	for	the	companies	which	reduce	
their disposition and willingness to comply (Ashton et al. 2001).
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It	is	however	important	to	note	that	different	levels	of	weakness	prevail	both	with	regard	to	spe-
cific	policy	fields	and	sub-regions.	With	regard	to	corporate	spending	for	social	development	
issues, South Africa is, for example, an exceptional case since companies are legally obliged to 
contribute to the social transformation of the country; a policy that is closely monitored and 
enforced by the government. Corporate spending for charitable issues has received a major 
boost with the introduction of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) legislation. Increasingly 
under pressure to improve the situation of the black majority of the country, according to this 
legislation,	firms	are	required	to	transfer	part	of	their	capital	to	black-owned	businesses	and	to	
make a contribution to communities of 1 % of their annual revenues in order to maintain their 
license	to	operate.	In	addition,	BEE	legislation	establishes	specific	targets	for	the	achievement	
of changes in spheres such as ownership, employment, tender and procurement processes, 
promotion and training opportunities, which are closely monitored in the form of detailed 
scorecards for a number of industries. BEE constitutes a major driver among South African 
businesses	and	its	respective	effects	need	to	be	carefully	separated	from	other	phenomena	of	
CSR, especially with regard to environmental issues. These are generally underrepresented in 
the South African discourse on CSR due to the dominance of other issues, such as poverty alle-
viation.	However,	with	environmental	impacts	affecting	more	and	more	communities,	addres-
sing such impacts in the context of BEE or corporate social investment might become more 
prevalent in the future.
This constitutes the background against which the interrelation between global environmental 
norms and standards, company behaviour, and national environmental regulation and imple-
mentation is to be analysed. The following sections provide for an overview of these dynamics 
with regard to two important sectors of the South African economy, the food & beverage and 
the mining industry. 
4. Companies, Global Norms, and National Environmental Regulation – 
 The Case of the South African Food & Beverage and Mining Industries
4.1 Two Sectors – Two Dynamics?
There have been empirical and theoretical reasons to choose the mining and the food & be-
verage industry for this study. First, both sectors with their close links to resource use, have 
not only been, historically, the most important industries with regard to their contribution to 
the GDP, but also in terms of their political weight. South Africa has been built on its mineral 
wealth. The country owns some of the world’s richest reserves of diamonds, gold, coal, iron 
ore, platinum, chrome, and several other minerals. The mining sector’s relative importance to 
the GDP was overturned by manufacturing only in the 1950s and has afterwards been steadily 
decreasing. However, with a share of about 40% mining remains a major contributor to South 
Africa’s export earnings (Malherbe 2000). The food & beverage sector in South Africa is of consi-
derable relevance for the overall economy. It constitutes the third largest manufacturing sector 
by	gross	value	of	production	(18	%	after	metals	and	petrol	refining).
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Second, together with energy producer Eskom and the chemical industry both sectors have 
the highest negative impact on the South African environment and therefore pose particular 
challenges for sustainable development. The mining industry causes large-scale destructions of 
landscapes	which	include	erosions,	siltation,	deforestation	and	desertification.	The	use	of	toxic	
chemicals entails the pollution of soils and rivers, while air pollution is generated by the dust 
from bulldozing and tailing dams. Toxic waste management and the rehabilitation schemes for 
old mines are crucial regulatory issues. Especially in water-scarce South Africa, the industry’s 
enormous consumption of water as well as the phenomenon of acid water drainage are further 
critical	issues.	These	negative	environmental	effects	combine	with	issues	of	social	inequality.	
The South African mining industry has a bad record of low environmental and social standards, 
as its labour intensive economic strategy has been built on the supply of extremely cheap mi-
grant labour, supported by the apartheid regime9. During the apartheid era, polluting indus-
tries such as mining were set-up near black townships and homelands. Also, migrant workers’ 
settlements were located near the mines so that the poor and discriminated population has 
been particularly exposed to environmental pollution.
 
While the food & beverage sector probably does not match the mining sector in terms of the 
intensity of the impacts, there are still a few distinct challenges facing the sector. With the in-
dustrialization	and	commodification	of	food	production,	which	has	taken	place	in	South	Africa	
over the past years, the impact of these production processes on natural resources has increased 
substantially. Such developments have led and will further contribute to a serious degradation 
and over-utilization of soil and water resources. If continued at current levels, water use in the 
agricultural sector will aggravate the problem of water-scarcity in the drought-prone regions 
of South Africa. The increased deployment of fertilizers and pesticides in high-intensity agri-
culture is expected to further impair the quality of water and soil resources. While these are 
impacts related more directly to the agricultural sector, food processing companies are incre-
asingly forced to show responsibility for these impacts as well. Due to its dependency on the 
agricultural sector the food manufacturing sector is extremely vulnerable to changing climate 
conditions, droughts and water shortages. 
Introduction of Hypotheses
Both characteristics make the mining and food & beverage industry particularly important 
case studies as they are key to understanding the interplay of global CSR norms, corporate en-




sector structure, the number of foreign MNCs versus South African expatriated companies, the 
9 Interview with Director/Centre for Sustainability in Mining and Industry, Johannesburg, South Af-
rica,16.03.2007.
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strength of organised business interests, and the awareness of local and international civil so-
ciety and public actors as regards negative environmental impacts per sector. These variations 
have provided for a number of theoretically deducted reasons for case selection. Here we will 
restrict ourselves to introducing two that have mainly guided our selection of cases. We assume 
that sector characteristics such as the sector structure and the strength of business associations 
play a decisive role in explaining in what scheme of collective regulation companies engage and 
whether a demand for a fostering of public regulation is to be expected.
The literature on associative corporate self-regulation (Ronit/Schneider 2000) has pointed out 
that organizing in business associations is an important precondition for a possible commit-
ment to self-regulation. Associations help to solve the collective action problems faced by indi-
vidual	firms.	The	temptation	for	an	individual	firm	to	take	advantage	of	the	regulatory	require-
ments of its competitors to obtain an advantage in the market is considerable. This temptation 
is attenuated by the discipline imposed by associations (Ronit/Schneider 1999). If international 
business associations mobilize advocacy support for corporate self-regulation, success is not 
only much more likely (Kell/Ruggie 1999: 3). Associations can also help to mitigate the free-ri-
der problem. In the absence of associations that monitor compliance with corporate regulatory 
standards,	firms	may	seek	public	regulation	resorting	to	legal	enforcement	mechanisms.	From	
these considerations on associations and self-regulation, we derive and empirically explore the 
following claim: In sectors with weak associations and low associative membership of firms at the inter-
national, national and sub-national level, MNCs will be more likely to seek state regulation conforming to 
international standards. Strong associative structures, on the contrary, support private self-regulation.10
These claims are interrelated with an argument brought forward in the same literature with 
regard to sector structure. It argues that a high level of self-regulation is more likely in sectors 
with a limited number of producers. Under these conditions, free-riding and nonconformi-
ty with self-imposed (associational) rules can be more easily observed (Ronit/Schneider 1999). 
Individual	firms	have	an	 incentive	 to	monitor	competitors	and	 to	sanction	non-compliance	
with associational rules. In contrast, in a sector with many market actors, non-compliance with 
regulatory codes would more easily go unobserved. In sectors with few players, MNCs have fewer 
incentives to promote corporate regulatory standards to be turned into state regulation and rather turn to 
self-regulation, whereas they are more likely to seek public legal standards in sectors with many players.
However, theories on the behaviour of organised business interest suggest that strong business 
associations do not exclusively lead to self-regulation but can work both ways resulting in state 
regulation via neo-corporatist or tripartite arrangements.11 Often companies decide to organize 
collectively and found a business association for the task of lobbying government to achieve 
the	twofold	advantage	of	saving	costs	and	gaining	effectiveness	through	collective	action	(see	
Schmitter/Streek 1981). Still it has to be explained why companies would accept a loss of auto-
10 See also Börzel/Héritier/Müller-Debus (2007) for a discussion of this argument.
11 The following line of argument is drawn from a project background paper by Christian Thauer 
(2006).
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nomy and allow a business association to exercise power over them in collective self-regulati-
on. The key argument of Streek/Schmitter (1981) in this regard is that the strength of business 
associations	and	hence	their	capacity	to	effectively	engage	in	self-regulation	depends	on	their	
access to external resources which they are able to provide to their individual members. This is 
the case if the respective business association is involved in tripartite modes of decision-ma-
king	(see	Streeck/Kenworthy	2003).	From	this	line	of	argument,	we	modify	the	first	part	of	the	
hypothesis introduced above: In sectors with strong associative structures, companies will engage via 
business associations in both shaping state regulation and through collective private self-regulation.
Both factors, sector structure and the strength of business associations, have been varied in the 
following investigation. The mining sector consists of only a few large market participants and 
displays strong associative structures. Mining is an oligopolistic industry due to high entry 
barriers set by high initial investment requirements. In the context of the apartheid regime, a 
monopolistic economic structure dominated by seven mining houses emerged. After interna-
tional	sanctions	against	the	apartheid	regime	were	imposed	in	1974,	cutting	off	South	African	
companies	from	international	markets,	these	mining	houses	evolved	into	diversified	conglo-
merations that dominated large parts of the isolated, import-substituting South African econo-
my (Feinstein 2005; Fine/Rustomjee 1996). After the transition to democracy in 1994, the indus-
try underwent a comprehensive restructuring process. Re-entering global markets companies 
concentrated on mining as their core business. Today, the South African mining sector is made 
up of some of the world’s largest transnational mining corporations, many of which have their 
origin in South Africa. Amongst them are those of South African origin such as Anglo Ameri-
can, AngloGold Ashanti, DeBeers and Gold Fields. Other global heavy-weights operate in South 
Africa such as the Australian corporate Rio Tinto, the Canadian company Barrick Gold and the 
Anglo-Australian BHP Billiton. Besides these large companies, a number of highly specialized 
exploration and mining companies, often providing services to larger operations, exist. In ad-
dition,	 an	 increasing	number	of	 smaller	BEE	firms	have	 emerged,	 such	as	African	Rainbow	
Minerals or Exxaro (Malherbe 2000).
The food & beverage sector, by contrast, displays a considerable heterogeneity and variability in 
terms	of	firm	size	and	type.	The	industry	reflects	the	country’s	manifold	agricultural	activities,	
and is often characterized as typical for an emerging market economy as there exists a ‘smallish 
First World economy in a larger Third World one’ (Mbendi 2007). The food & beverage sector is 
characterized	by	a	large	number	of	firms	of	different	sizes,	a	high	degree	of	market	fragmenta-
tion	and	weak	associative	structures	across	the	different	sub-sectors.	Within	its	various	subsec-
tors, it is highly concentrated, with several large listed companies controlling both production 
capacity and sales in most food categories (Hill 2000; Fig 2004). While the estimated of number 
companies in the industry amounts to 1,800 there is a clear dominance by the top ten compa-
nies, which are responsible for 68% of the industry’s turnover. Concentration is a consequence 
of both apartheid agricultural marketing legislation and the technological barriers to entry into 
the food-processing market. By introducing limited licensing on food processing operations 
the apartheid regime intended to safeguard white farmers’ income (Vink/Kirsten 2002). As a 
consequence regional monopolies could be created for some products (e.g. dairy processing). In 
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addition,	technological	barriers	also	prevented	a	further	diversification.	As	a	result,	the	sector	is	
characterized by ‘extreme levels’ of concentration across the subdivisions of the sector (Mather 
2005). After 1960, the development in the food sector could hence be characterized by a further 
concentration and fragmentation, two seemingly antagonistic trends, which were equally boo-
sted by the liberalization of agricultural markets starting in the late 1980s. In some sub-sectors, 
this led to the emergence of new market actors, mostly smaller processors and thus an expan-
sive growth of the number of companies. Other sub-sectors have reacted with intensive restruc-
turing processes involving several mergers and acquisitions and thus a further concentration 
of production capacity (Mather 2005). Until today, this development has rendered a sector cha-
racterized	by	a	high	market	share	and	influence	of	a	few	large	companies	which	are	at	the	same	
time increasingly challenged by a growing number of smaller market entrants and competition 
from companies entering the market from countries such as India and Brazil (COSATU 2004).
Who Are the “Potential Suspects”
Which companies have we been looking at? In both sectors predominantly the large and glo-
bally integrated MNCs have increasingly adopted CSR norms. The large mining companies 
have	figured	prominently	 in	debates	 on	 corporate	 citizenship	 and	 sustainable	 development	
and engaged in environmental self-regulation. In terms of public information and disclosure 
all major mining companies have adopted the CSR discourse, having elaborated websites which 
inform about the companies‘ CSR engagement and producing sustainability or social reports 
in	addition	to	their	annual	financial	reporting.	By	2006,	these	companies	report	according	to	
the standards of the GRI, taking the principles of the South African King Report into account. 
In	a	recent	accountability	ranking	of	the	biggest	52	companies	listed	at	the	JSE,	five	out	of	eight	
mining companies scored among the top ten (McNulty 2006).12 Those who are listed at the JSE 
all appear on its Social Responsibility Index. Anglo American and BHP Billiton are amongst 
the	top	five;	these	global	leaders	of	the	industry	are	followed	by	a	number	of	large	South	Afri-
ca based companies, such as AngloGold Ashanti, Gold Fields, Impala Platinum and Harmony 
(Jenkins	2006;	List	et	al.	1995).	Moreover,	most	of	them	have	acquired	ISO	14001	certification	
for their environmental management systems.13 What is particular to the mining industry is the 
prominent	role	of	sector-specific	voluntary	initiatives	at	the	global	level	which	coordinate	the	
discourse and approach of the industry’s global players towards issues such as sustainability, 
human rights or social development.14
Reflecting	the	heterogeneity	of	the	food	&	beverage	sector,	there	is	also	a	multitude	of	different	
approaches towards corporate social and environmental responsibility to be found throughout 
12 The ranking was conducted by the Centre for Corporate Citizenship/UNISA in collaboration with the 
UK based NGO “Accountability”, using its accountability standards as measurement. 
13 This information has been drawn from the respective company websites.
14	Voluntary	Principles	on	Security	and	Human	Rights	 (2007),	Kimberly	Process	Certification	Scheme	
(KPCS 2007), Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI 2007), Initiative for Responsible Min-
ing Assurance (IRMA 2007), International Council on Mining & Metals (ICMM 2007).
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the sector. In mirroring the policies of their mother companies, subsidiaries of international 
companies (examples are Unilever and Coca-Cola) have developed their own codes of conduct 
with regard to their social and environmental performance. These codes usually do not follow 
any	agreed	rules	or	guidelines	and	mostly	aim	at	defining	a	company’s	ideal	behaviour	towards	
CSR issues, such as product responsibility, interaction with and consultation of stakeholders, 
supply chain relations etc. Other companies have chosen to join business associations for pro-
moting CSR, both locally in South Africa and abroad (mostly for companies listed in the UK, 
US). Others have aligned themselves with externally-derived sets of principles, such as the Glo-
bal Compact, the GRI, the Global Sullivan Principles as well as the Accountability Standards 
AA1000. Companies have also used King II to align their sustainability strategies (King Com-
mittee 2002). CSR among many South African food & beverage companies currently seems to 
evolve around charitable activities of corporations oftentimes undertaken by public relations 
or	external	affairs	departments	with	the	goal	of	extending	brand	recognition	and	reputation	
management (Fig 2004). Local CSR programmes are also vigorously pursued by international 
players, while they also apply mixed strategies addressing local communities as well as running 
country-wide programs (e.g. Unilever). A hint towards the role of external standards and their 
effect	on	the	conduct	of	South	African	companies	is	provided	by	the	depatriation	of	South	Af-
rican Breweries (SAB) which, after being listed at the London Stock Exchange, reacted to more 
stringent standards for corporate reporting on corporate responsibility issued in Europe by 
establishing an accordingly demanding reporting scheme and enforcing compliance within all 
its operations, including those in South Africa.15
Comparing	the	two	industries,	the	awareness	and	discourse	with	regard	to	CSR	differs	accor-
ding to the size and geographical reach, major markets as well as the origin of companies. 
While large global companies such as BHP Billiton or Unilever take the lead in rankings such 
as the Social Responsibility Index of the JSE, smaller companies of South African origin are 
‘followers’ at best, and even smaller enterprises are not participating in the discourse at all16. 
The mining sector is a good example for this, with an increasing number of medium and small 
mining enterprises having emerged in the course of the industry’s restructuring process. They 
are	mostly	subcontracting	firms	supplying	technical	assistance	and	machinery	or	exploratory	
services to larger companies. They usually do not have the historical legacy, are much less vi-
sible and follow a more risk-friendly business strategy. Hence the business case to engage in 
voluntary	CSR	initiatives	is	rather	limited.	In	addition	smaller	companies	do	not	have	the	profit	
margins	to	afford	extensive	CSR	measures	(Szablowski	2007:	79;	Malherbe	2000).17 In the food 
&	beverage	sector,	there	is	a	significant	difference	in	the	rigour	and	depth	of	CSR	programmes	
and policies maintained by multinationals, such as Coca-Cola, Unilever and Nestlé and local 
South African food companies, such as Pioneer Foods. While the former are to some extent even 
driving the international discourse on social responsibility, the latter are currently catching up 
15 Interview with Environmental Manager/SAB, Johannesburg, South Africa, 16.03.2007.
16 Interview with Environmental Manager/BHP Billiton, Witbank, South Africa, 26.11.2007.
17 Interview with Deputy Directors Environment/DME, Pretoria, South Africa, 27.03.2007; Interview with 
Consultant and Lecturer/School of Mining Engineering at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johan-
nesburg, South Africa, 20.03.2007.
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and looking at larger companies for suitable approaches, which they then intend to adapt to 
their own needs and capabilities.18
4.2 Modes of Interaction
Multinational companies operate in a complex national and international, legislative and nor-
mative regulatory environment that shapes their environmental policies. In the following, we 
are not investigating individual environmental programmes at the company level, but provide 
a	mapping	of	how	firms	are	involved	in	collective	environmental	regulation	at	the	national	and	
local level. We ask when, and if, where they contribute to foster collective environmental regula-
tion.	Do	we	observe	a	diffusion	of	global	standards	into	collective	national	and	local	governance	
through	companies?	Do	firms	seek	collective	solutions	through	state	regulation,	as	our	initial	
question suggests, or do they prefer other forms of regulating and implementing collective 
policies	in	the	environmental	field?	
Involvement in Public Regulation
During the last couple of years, developments at the global level have driven the national envi-
ronmental	agendas	of	governments	and	business	to	a	significant	degree.	Extractive	industries	
have received particular attention and as a result, mining companies are involved in a number 
of publicly initiated policy forums and multi-stakeholder processes. In the aftermath of the 
WSSD 2002 in Johannesburg, South Africa has taken part in the Intergovernmental Forum on 
Mining and Sustainable Development, initiated by United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development	(UNCTAD)	and	United	Nations	Department	of	Economic	and	Social	Affairs	(UN-
DESA), UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the Canadian Department 
of	Foreign	Affairs	and	International	Trade	(DFAIT),	to	encourage	member	states	to	implement	
the relevant mining clauses of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. To address these is-
sues, the South African Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) developed an implementati-
on strategy and initiated a national Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and 
Sustainable Development, consisting of government departments, the mining industry, labour 
and non-governmental organisations (Burger 2005: 456).
At the national level, MNCs participate in a range of consultation forums which are prescribed 
by the South African legislation with regard to environmental legislation. In the context of the 
propagated “co-operative government” approach of the ANC government, the major pieces of 
environmental legislation have put extensive consultative procedures in place. Apart from old-
grown informal lobby channels between these important industries and the respective state ad-
ministration, a range of formal consultation forums are used. EIAs, as prescribed by the NEMA 
require comprehensive stakeholder participation forums, and the key legislation in mining, the 
18	Interview	with	Manager	Corporate	Affairs/Pioneer	Foods,	Paarl,	South	Africa,	02.04.2007.
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Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA), provides for the establishment 
of a multi-stakeholder board which includes a number of departments, industry, labour and ci-
vil society, with the task to advice the minister. At the operation level, integrated environmental 
management plans (EMPs) are required that have to assure an adequate coordination with local 
government. Further examples for such consultations are national hearings on the new waste 
management legislation in the in the food & beverage sector, which was initiated in early 2007.
Participation in such consultations, of course, can be used either way: to prevent stricter regu-
lation or to contribute to a fostering of environmental standards and their implementation, 
where	this	is	congruent	with	company	interests.	While	it	is	difficult	to	track	negotiations	within	
such forums comprehensively, some conclusions can be drawn. Even though environmental 
legislation in South Africa is predominantly driven by the state, there are a few examples which 
can be used to indicate when and under which conditions companies actually contributed to a 
fostering of state regulatory capacity through their participation in these forums.
In the food & beverage industry companies have participated in consultative processes parti-
cularly on the issue of packaging. Interestingly these activities are closely related to previous 
self-governing advances around packaging e.g. on the issue of recycling of packaging material. 
In this case companies seem to have anticipated the upcoming waste management regulation 
by developing their own recycling system. Government legislation appears to be the last step in 
establishing	industry	positions	in	official	legislation.	After	engaging	with	peers	and	other	stake-
holders, bringing the approaches developed by industry to fruition will ensure that competitors 
within the sector and beyond will have to follow similar strategies and thus possibly incur costs. 
A similar example is the looming regulation on mine closure. In the process of developing the 
act, government consulted with AngloGold Ashanti to adopt parts of its mine closure policy as 
a blueprint, which will actually raise the requirements for other companies with less compre-
hensive mine closure provisions.19 Both cases, however, rather provide evidence for fostering 
in a broad sense. The looming shadow of hierarchy of an upcoming public regulation in these 
issue areas has initiated private engagement. 
Another area of fostering is the building of weak administrative capacities, especially at the 
provincial and local tier of state administration. In a number of cases, companies engage in 
capacity-building of local administrations. In South Africa companies are for example required 
by law to integrate their local policies within the framework of Integrated Development Plans 
of municipalities. This is not enforced and there are many examples of companies ignoring or 
circumventing	 ineffective	 state	 agencies.	However,	 there	 are	 counterexamples	 of	 companies	
engaging in supporting the development and implementation of these plans and related envi-
19	Interview	with	 Public	Affairs	Manager	 and	Environmental	Manager/AngloGold	Ashanti,	 Johannes-
burg, South Africa, 20.03.2007.
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ronmental policies.20 Food companies have become active with regards to capacity-building of 
local administration in the area of good farming practices as well as food quality issues.21
Difficulties	 in	 implementing	 the	elaborated	South	African	Water	Act	provide	another	exam-
ple. The act requires companies to reapply for new water licenses, which requires them to go 
through a complex procedure involving a comprehensive EIA. The departments’ own capacities 
have proven to be weak in dealing with the large number of applications combined with the 
ambitious requirement of the act itself. Due to the slow bureaucratic procedures and the lack 
of monitoring and enforcement capacities of the government, mines use to operate without 
having a water license. Even though the claim of the Chamber of Mines that large companies 
were	in	danger	of	disqualification	from	ISO	14001	seems	to	be	exaggerated22, the issue of legal 
compliance is a recurrent issue of debate during ISO audits.23 The department has recognised 
capacity problems and is cooperating with the industry in a number of issues. According to the 
Chamber	of	Mines,	training	programmes	have	been	offered	and	the	department	agreed	to	com-
mission consultants with processing parts of the application and registration workload. This is 
an	illustration	of	how	a	transnational	voluntary	standard	such	as	the	ISO	14001	certificate	mo-
tivates companies to engage in capacity building support to implement national environmental 
legislation.
Generally, we have found great variance in company behavior in this regard, both, within and 
across sectors, and between municipalities. In the next phase of our research, we will take a 
closer	look	at	these	patterns	to	explain	these	differences.
Public-Private Co-Regulation 
Public-private co-regulation between government and industry is understood as the equal par-
ticipation of both partners in rule setting and/or implementation. Such an approach has been 
successfully used by the government in the area of social transformation of the country, as 
provided	for	by	the	government’s	BEE	program.	Sector-specific	charters	have	been	negotiated	
between	industry	and	government	that	set	industry-specific	targets	with	regard	to	black	owner-
ship of companies, social spending, and health and which are monitored through a scorecard 
system (MPRDA 2002). Having introduced ambitious labour standards as well as spending for 
social and community issues around their operations as a legal requirement, South Africa is an 
20 AngloGold Ashanti claims to have adopted extensive mechanisms to engage with local administra-
tions to improve their governance capacities and thereby serve the companies’ long-term interest of 
having	a	capable	public	authority	delivering	public	services,	Interview	with	Public	Affairs	Manager/An-
gloGold Ashanti, Johannesburg, South Africa, 20.03.2007.
21 Interview with Environmental Manager/Clover, Roodeport, South Africa, 23.03.2007.
22 Interview with Environmental Adviser/Chamber of Mines, Johannesburg, South Africa, 16.03.2007.
23 Interview with Environmental Manager, BHP Billiton, Witbank, South Africa, 26.11.2007; Interview with 
Manager Sustainable Development/AngloPlatinum, Johannesburg, South Africa, 20.11.2007 amongst 
others.
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exceptional case of a country in which CSR is required by law. Environmental issues, however, 
have not (yet) played a prominent role. 
The South African government is the driving agent to engage stakeholders, including business 
actors from all sectors, in environmental policy formulation and implementation. There are 
ample	general	and	issue-specific	multi-stakeholder	forums	which	are	proscribed	in	the	natio-
nal legislation or which are initiated by national or local government as a response to a parti-
cular problem pressure. 
In	the	environmental	field	the	issue	of	energy	efficiency	is	one	example	of	co-regulation,	 in	
which business has been a driving part. Spearheaded by the Sustainable Futures Unit of the 
NBI,	 voluntary	energy	efficiency	 targets	have	been	 transformed	 into	a	 sector-specific	energy	
efficiency	accord	adopted	by	the	DME	and	flagship	companies	across	sectors,	 in	which	both	
partners agreed on targets to reduce energy consumption.24 To date, the project has culminated 
in	31	companies	and	industry	associations	signing	a	voluntary	Energy	Efficiency	Accord	with	
the DME to reduce their energy consumption. Owing to the fact that, besides this highly visible 
initiative,	similar	ones	could	not	be	identified,	we	assume	that	this	form	of	interaction	is	not	a	
very common form of engagement.
Companies also engage in multi-stakeholder initiatives either at the transnational level, or 
initiated by companies within the local context of their operations. At the transnational le-
vel, a number of multi-stakeholder initiatives have emerged engaging in the development of 
transnational voluntary standards and codes of conducts. The voluntary international Cyanide 
Management Code, which was developed by UNEP, NGOs and the International Council on 
Mining	&	Metals	(ICMM),	is	a	case	where	a	transnational	sector-specific	standard	has	trickled	
down into national legislation. Having been adopted by nine of the largest gold producers in 
the world in 2005, the South African Chamber of Mines initiated a multi-stakeholder process, 
which adopted a national voluntary guideline. Drawing on these two documents, the state’s 
Mines Safety and Health Inspectorate has approved a mandatory guideline of good practice. 
Companies	which	do	not	comply,	may	be	charged	with	an	administrative	fine.
A	similar	spill	over	effect	from	the	transnational	to	the	national	level	is	taking	place	with	regard	
to	 a	 sector-specific	 initiative	on	biodiversity.	 Inspired	by	 a	 joint	 initiative	of	 the	 Internatio-
nal Union of Conservation (IUCN) and the ICMM at the transnational level, the South African 
IUCN-branch and the South African Chamber of Mines have initiated the establishment of a 
formal multi-stakeholder forum to deal with biodiversity management as related to mining. 
While legislation is blocked between the environmental and the mining department, the South 
Africa Mining and Biodiversity Forum (SAMB) provides a platform for discussion, involving the 
Chamber of Mines South Africa, conservation groups and the government (DEAT, DME, and 
Department	of	Water	Affairs	and	Forestry/DWAF).
24 Interview with Environmental Adviser/Chamber of Mines, Johannesburg, South Africa, 16.11.2007.
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At the local level, a number of multi-stakeholder initiatives exist, which are either part of com-
panies’	stakeholder	management	policies,	or	address	issue–specific	concerns,	such	as	the	deli-
very of particular services or collective action problems with regard to an environmental pro-
blem in an area. Beverage companies have increasingly engaged in multi-stakeholder initiatives 
to address water governance issues at the sub-national level. In some cases, this has resulted 
in very concrete collaboration with distinct communities on water management or other envi-
ronmental issues. In other cases, activities were organised around the beverage value chain, in-
volving not only the companies involved in the value chain, but also the respective stakeholder 
groups.25 Companies are more likely to initiate a multi-stakeholder initiative when confronted 
with a concrete urge to solve an environmental problem. Such an urge might be caused by pu-
blic	attention	and	protest,	or	another	direct	cost	effect	of	a	problem.26 
In response to civil society pressure, the gold-mining company Harmony is for example liaising 
with both the municipality and the Randfontein Environmental Action Group to reduce fugi-
tive dust from its slime dams around Randfontein (Harmony 2006: 60).27 Unilever has initiated 
a forum to discuss environmental impacts and natural resources management at its Boksburg 
site.	The	forum	is	intended	to	bring	together	stakeholders	concerned	with	or	affected	by	deteri-
orating environmental quality in the area, which to some extent is due to Unilever’s operations 
there. Unilever funds the manager of the forum, while keeping it open for participation by a 
wide range of stakeholders, including other industries. The work in the stakeholder forum is 
intended to result in concrete suggestions for the clean-up of the Boksburg lake.28
While there are a number of examples for a fostering of environmental regulation in a broa-
der sense, there is little evidence of a fostering of public environmental regulation, initiated 
by companies as a response to requirements deriving from transnational environmental CSR 
standards. We are now turning to the area of private initiatives of environmental self-regulati-
on. According to our hypothesis we expect them to prevail in the mining sector as opposed to 
no such activities in the food & beverage industry.
Collective Private Self-Regulation
The mining industry has faced extensive criticism for its negative impact on the environment, 
especially in developing countries. In order to counter increasing public pressure, the industry 
has come up with a number of initiatives, not only at the company level, but also in the form 
of collective business responses at the transnational level.29 In 1999 nine of the largest mining 
25 Interview with Corporate Sustainability Manager/SAB Miller, Johannesburg, South Africa, 16.03.2007.
26 For the latter see project article on HIV/AIDS regulation Börzel/Héritier/Müller-Debus (2007) forth-
coming.
27	Interview	with	Environmental	Manager	and	Manager	of	Corporate	Affairs/Harmony	Gold,	Randfon-
tein, South Africa, 02.10.2007.
28 Interview with Corporate Sustainability Manager/Unilever, Durban, South Africa, 04.11.2007.
29 Based on Prakash (2005), Szablowszki (2007) and own research.
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companies closed ranks to form the Global Mining Initiative (GMI), presenting the industry 
as committed to environmental principles and standards. In preparation of the WSSD in Jo-
hannesburg 2002, a comprehensive consultation and research program was initiated; the Mi-
ning/Metals and Sustainable Development process (MMSD). For a period of two years, a com-
prehensive	consultation	and	research	effort	was	undertaken	to	come	up	with	a	state	of	the	art	
of sustainability policies within the industry, amongst others in the Southern African region. 
As a result, the ICMM was established and mandated to develop a common global reporting 
standard for the industry, the Sustainable Development Framework (SDF).30 Membership in the 
ICMM implies to report according to the SDF framework. Working groups on critical issues 
with regard to mining and sustainable development meet regularly, and guidelines on sustaina-
bility issues that are crucial to the global agenda are developed. Even though its membership 
has increased from six major companies and three industry associations in 2004 (Prakash 2005) 
to 15 of the largest global mining companies and 24 national and transnational commodity 
associations in 2007, buy-in from industry peers has been rather limited (Szablowski 2007: 85). 
The	extent	to	which	any	effects	have	materialised	on	the	impact	side	is	doubtful,	according	to	a	
number of critical voices. Advocates however claim that these processes have served as impor-
tant channels of exchanging information. Thereby the initiative has raised awareness within 
the industry which may eventually lead to behavioural change (Szablowski 2007).31 Interviews 
with the major players of the mining industry frequently referred to the ICMM as providing 
orientation and blueprints for new policies and best practice examples in South Africa.
At the national level, all larger mining companies are part of the South African Chamber of 
Mines, which acts as the major spokes body for the big mining companies vis-à-vis the South 
African government. The national body of the mining industry, the South African Chamber 
of Mines, has traditionally been a powerful industry body, and represents about 90% of the 
industry.	While	 its	 influence	has	diminished	with	 the	end	of	apartheid,	 it	 still	 serves	as	 the	
main coordination body of the large mining houses. With regard to environmental policies, its 
environmental advisor provides background information to member companies and facilitates 
exchange and the development of common industry positions and guidelines on key envi-
ronmental	issues.	An	environmental	working	group	is	made	up	of	technical	staff	of	member	
companies, and an environmental committee discusses industry positions at the management 
level. As its largest members, Anglo American and BHP Billiton, the Chamber of Mines is also a 
member	of	the	ICMM.	Efforts	are	being	made	to	establish	an	industry-wide	voluntary	reporting	
scheme. The board of the Chamber of Mines has adopted a decision that such a standard will 
require members to report the CSR performance of their South African operations to the cham-
ber	(instead	of	providing	a	global	report).	To	raise	the	profile	of	the	South	African	industry,	it	is	
planned to publish an integrated CSR report issued by the Chamber of Mines. 32
30 Following the MMSD process, the former transnational mining association ICME was transformed 
into the ICMM, charged with carrying forward the GMI agenda. See www.icmm.com for further de-
tails.
31 Interview with Consultant and Lecturer/School of Mining Engineering at the University of the Witwa-
tersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, 20.03.2007.
32 Interview with Environmental Adviser/Chamber of Mines, Johannesburg, South Africa, 16.03.2007.
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Within the industry, benchmarking, peer pressure and reputation seem to be the major mecha-
nisms of fostering environmental regulation and performance horizontally across companies. 
Indeed, companies that engage in CSR compete with their peers in best practice, reputation 
gains being the major driving force in this context. At the same time, smaller companies, which 
usually do not engage in CSR, were frequently referred to as a major problem for global corpo-
rates. Even though companies claim that it is the responsibility of the government to regulate 
the environmental performance of these smaller players33, there are a few attempts to involve 
smaller competitors into environmental forums and processes. Gold Fields referred to the ex-
ample of water pollution in the West Rand area. Being the biggest company in the area, Gold-
fields	has	been	mainly	criticised	for	pollution,	while	also	smaller	mines	downstream	contribute	
to the problem. Trying to improve the environmental performance of companies in the region, 
regional consultations have been initiated within the framework of a regional water forum.34
While	sector-specific	forums	and	reporting	standards	prevail	in	mining,	collective	private	self-
regulation in the food & beverage industry is more fragmented. Lacking the existence of a 
similar process as the mining sector at the national as well as the international level, corpo-
rate	private	self-regulation	mostly	takes	place	on	a	less	firmly	institutionalised	level	(Fig	2004).	
Business associations are weak and fragmented and exist for the individual product categories 
or sub-sectors in the food sector. They have, however, so far not developed a strong record on 
environmental or CSR issues in general. Associative activities do not necessarily emerge in the 
context	of	specific	subsectors,	but	are	often	related	to	a	management	issue,	such	as	recycling.	
As an example, Coca-Cola has joined forces with other beverage producers as well as other 
players along the supply chain to establish best practices for bottle recycling in anticipation of 
upcoming waste management legislation in South Africa. Similarly SAB has worked with other 
businesses to develop a glass recycling scheme. These two cases demonstrate that business has 
become active in areas where national legislation is still pending in order to make use of the 
window of opportunity to shape legislation according to their own standards, which might have 
been established on the international level.
Outside	these	national	initiatives,	particularly	larger	firms	relate	to	international	approaches,	
e.g. in the area of reporting, in their CSR or environmental management strategies. Oftentimes, 
larger	corporations	serve	as	a	model	for	smaller,	South	Africa	based	firms.	While	it	is	mostly	
acknowledged that not the full range of issues can be addressed, there is a general tendency to 
be observed to follow industry leaders on several issues.35




34	Interview	with	 Public	Affairs	Manager	 and	Environmental	Manager/AngloGold	Ashanti,	 Johannes-
burg, South Africa, 20.03.2007.
35 Interview with Corporate Sustainability Manager/SAB Miller, Johannesburg, South Africa, 16.03.2007.
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Vertical supply chain regulation is another important mechanism of transferring global stan-
dards via MNCs onto local companies. Upstream supply chain management in mining does 
rarely take place; what is mostly presented as supply chain standards are CSI activities with 
regard to local business promotion beyond the company’s core business, or refers to local sup-
pliers of food to the mine.36 In the food & beverage sector, however, regulation along the supply 
chain is much more widespread. Several bigger companies, such as SAB and Nestlé, employ 
environmental management systems to monitor environmental compliance along their supply 
chain. Also larger South African corporations, such as National Brands, assign responsibilities 
for sound procurement practices to various actors within their supply chain. Such regulation, 
however	seems	to	be	limited	to	the	larger	players	in	the	industry.	Smaller	firms,	such	as	Pre-
mier Foods, do not exert any pressure along their supply chain and rather rely on intermediary 
players to control upstream parts of the supply chain. Issues such as food packaging have only 
emerged as an issue among some of the producers, e.g. in the milk industry37. In many cases, 
supply chain regulation reaches to the production of the raw material at the farm level. Parti-
cularly large breweries, bulk food producers, and, most prominently, companies such as Nestlé 
and Unilever have initiated programmes to propagate more sustainable practices among far-
mers	and	raw	material	producers.	In	some	cases	certification	schemes	developed	by	the	larger	
firms	based	on	international	environmental	systems	are	applied	to	monitor	performance	along	
the supply chain as well. This aspect is expected to gain in importance over the next year with 
increasing demand for organic food from export markets. In the beverage sector, larger corpo-
rations, for example Coca-Cola, work closely together with their bottlers and distributors on 
propagating standards through these channels for the downstream part of their value chain.38
A	third	area	of	private	self-initiatives	refers	to	partnerships	between	private	for-profit	actors	
and	private	not-for	profit	organisations.	They	are	found	in	both	industry	sectors	investigated.	
The Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA) was initiated in 2005 and brings to-
gether	a	group	of	large	mining	companies,	major	retailers	such	as	Tiffany	&	Co	and	Wal-Mart,	
and environmental NGOs such as Earthworks and the WWF39 to develop a number of volunta-
ry, non-binding standards on a number of issues. The initiative is of particular interest for its 
innovative approach. Learning from the experience of the diamond market and the Kimberley 
certification	scheme,	the	initiative	targets	the	value	chain	up	to	the	global	retailers	of	jewelle-
ry.
36 Interview with CSR Specialist/DeBeers, Johannesburg, South Africa, 19.03.2007.
37 Interview with Environmental Manager/Clover, Roodeport, South Africa, 23.03.2007.
38 Interview with Corporate Responsibility Manager/Coca-Cola Southern Africa, Johannesburg, South 
Africa, 26.03.2007.
39 Companies: AngloGold-Ashanti, BHP-Billiton, DeBeers Group, Falconbridge, Newmont, Rio Tinto, 
Xstrata;	 jewellery	retailers:	Tiffany	&	Co.,	Wal-Mart/Sam‘s	Club;	B.A.s:	Council	 for	Responsible	Jew-
ellery Practices, International Copper Association, ICMM, Jewelers of America, the Nickel Institute; 
NGOs: Canadian Boreal Initiative, Center for Science in Public Participation, Conservation Interna-
tional, EARTHWORKS, Great Basin Minewatch, Oxfam America, Pembina Institute, Renewable Re-
sources Coalition, WWF.
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At	the	local	level	we	find	activities	involving	sponsorship	for	NGOs	and	community	projects.	
Such partnerships have evolved out of business cases for CSR as well as from the CSR obliga-
tions involved in the BEE legislation, as explained above. An example is AngloAmerican’s spon-
sorship of a wetland conservation project. Partnering with a South African non-governmental 
organisation, Working for Wetlands, local people are trained in rehabilitation skills and care for 
off-site	wetlands	to	compensate	for	those	lost	on	site	owing	to	mining	(AngloAmerican	2005:	
40). In the food & beverage sector, there are examples in the sugar and sweets industry, where 
companies have turned to conservation societies, such as the WWF to assist them with the de-
velopment of standards to improve and monitor the performance along there supply chain.40 In 
other cases, companies have sought to engage with local community groups to support the mo-
nitoring of their environmental issues at the local level.41 Often such partnerships are mainly 
used for public relation purposes and do not relate directly to reducing negative environmental 
impacts of a company’s operations (Frynas 2005). 
4.3 Explaining Modes and Motivations for Fostering Environmental Regulation 
While companies have rarely been a driving force of fostering state regulation, understanding 
fostering in a broader sense, a variety of such activities is undertaken by corporate actors as re-
gards	environmental	regulation	in	South	Africa.	This	section	will	provide	for	a	first	interpreta-
tion	of	the	empirical	findings	in	the	light	of	the	previously	introduced	hypotheses.	In	addition,	
we will derive further explanatory variables as they are suggested by our observations.
Table 2. Schemes of MNE engagement that foster environmental regulation in a broad sense













Along the value chain
40 Interview with Corporate Responsibility Manager/Cadbury, Johannesburg, South Africa, 18.10.2007.
41 Interview with Corporate Responsibility Manager/Unilever SA, Durban, South Africa, 05.11.2007.
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Based on qualitative research, comprising desk research and interviews with a non-representa-
tive sample of experts, companies, government representatives and civil society, Table 2 repre-
sents	our	empirical	findings.	The	intensity	of	the	colour	shading	roughly	depicts	the	abundance	
and preference for the respective form of interaction in the two industry sectors.
Summarizing	our	findings	 (see	 table	2),	business	 is	 involved	 in	public	 regulation	 in	a	varie-
ty of forms. As government is partly overcoming widespread hostility and suspicion against 
“white big business”, especially at the middle and lower administrative levels, companies are 
actively approached to contribute to policy formulation and implementation in the context of 
institutionalized multi-stakeholder forums. While companies are involved in a large number 
of consultation forums at the national level, we have however rarely seen them actively see-
king state regulation. Even though we would still need to analyze these processes of policy 
formation more in depth, as a general trend, we have found little evidence that companies 
were pushing for improved environmental state regulation in order to approach international 
standards. This might also be related to the fact that many international standards have already 
found entry to the legislative framework in South Africa. Business is rather faced with an im-
plementation gap and is therefore taking on a more active role at this stage of the policy cycle. 
With regard to co-regulation, companies are involved in a number of institutionalized national 
tri-partite (mining) and multi-stakeholder negotiations (NEDLAC, all sectors nationally). These, 
however, rarely pertain to environmental issues, which are generally not high on the national 
CSR agenda. Particularly at the local level of implementation, however, we have found a cluster 
of fostering initiatives in both sectors in the form of multi-stakeholder initiatives and part-
nerships. Taking a closer look at various forms of collective regulation initiated by the private 
sector, companies contribute to environmental initiatives and programs at the local level by eit-
her participating in such government-initiated multi-stakeholder partnerships or by starting 
local initiatives with communities and NGOs. While similar approaches to collective regulation 
can be found in both sectors as regards local level multi-stakeholder and private-stakeholder 
initiatives, business associations play a much less prominent role in the food & beverage sector 
than in the mining industry. While in the latter, companies attempt to foster environmental 
standards through information exchange, peer pressure and other modes of non-hierarchical 
steering	 facilitated	 by	 the	Chamber	 of	Mines,	 in	 the	 former,	we	 do	 not	 find	 such	 attempts	
among peers. Rather, passing on regulation along the supply chain is of relevance, particularly 
in the context of production clusters for certain products.
 
How do we explain why companies have engaged in collective environmental regulation as in 
the	case	of	the	multi-stakeholder	biodiversity	forum,	the	public-private	energy	efficiency	tar-
gets, in planning a joint CSR report at the level of a business association, or in capacity-building 
measures for government departments? When and how do companies that have adopted volun-
tary transnational standards engage in the fostering of collective environmental regulation in a 
context,	where	a	significant	misfit	exists,	either	between	their	standards	and	public	regulation,	
and/or with regard to the performance of their industry peers?
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From a rational choice perspective, companies basically choose to engage in self- as well as in 
collective	regulation	efforts	because	they	are	driven	by	the	rationale	to	reduce	actual	costs	or	to	
avoid future ones. From a constructivist point of view, they may do so because it is appropriate 
to follow a respective norm either with regard to the transnational CSR discourse or to social 
norms at the local level. With the exception of two sector variables, the paper has not systemati-
cally tested such claims but has taken a more inductive, exploratory approach. Drawing on our 
mapping presented above, a preliminary set of factors is proposed that contributes to explai-
ning either under which conditions	“CSR-firms”	are	interested	in	fostering	collective	regulation,	
or how companies engage; i.e. which scheme of engagement companies chose to foster environ-
mental regulation: collective private self-regulation, co-regulation, or state regulation. 
With regard to the sector variables	proposed,	the	empirical	evidence	so	far	has	confirmed	that	the	
structure of an industry as regards the number and size of companies as well as the strength 
of	business	associations,	have	an	influence	on	the	schemes	of	collective	regulation	companies	
engage	in.	Companies	in	the	mining	industry	engage	in	sector-specific	collective	private	self	
regulation at the transnational and the national level, using the respective business association 
(ICMM/Chamber of Mines/joint reporting standard). At the same time, the Chamber of Mines 
represents the industry in a number of government-driven tripartite and multi-stakeholder 
forums, constituting a major vehicle of companies within the sector to engage with the govern-
ment. Firms sometimes foster regulation at the state level by providing advice and expertise, 
which has led to advanced regulation such as in the case of the new mine closure legislation. 
In	the	food	&	beverage	sector,	the	picture	is	somewhat	different.	Due	to	the	fragmented	asso-
ciative structure of the sector, collective private self-regulation via business association is not 
found to be of similar relevance and does only occur with regard to some issues, but is not 
institutionalized for the entire sector. Also, these business associations then only engage in con-
sultative	processes	offered	by	government	in	their	specific	area	of	expertise.	On	the	contrary,	
collective regulation along the supply chain is rather prevalent in this sector, complementing 
government policies in some cases as well. However, the large players in the food & beverage 
sector also maintain close relations to the government and actively contribute to consultative 
processes either as an individual company or as part of a business association. 
The empirical evidence from the food & beverage sector suggests that in a sector with many 
players	and	weak	business	associations,	we	do	not	find	collective	self-regulation	via	business	as-
sociations. On the contrary, evidence from the mining industry shows that international com-
panies which have adopted CSR standards, engage in a fostering of regulation via the sector’s 
strong business association. While this explains when companies engage in private self-regu-
lation with their peers, the strength of business associations and the structure of the sector do 
not explain whether companies seek for state regulation. Hence, our evidence so far discon-
firms	the	first	part	of	our	initial	hypothesis	with	regard	to	business	associations:	In sectors with 
few players, MNCs have fewer incentives to promote corporate regulatory standards to be turned into state 
regulation and rather turn to self-regulation, whereas they are more likely to seek public legal standards 
in sectors with many players. It has been shown, however, that in both sectors, large companies 
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engage	with	public	actors.	Therefore	the	modified	hypothesis	as	regards	strong	business	asso-
ciations is more plausible: In sectors with strong associative structures, companies will engage via busi-
ness associations in both shaping state regulation and through collective private self-regulation. Further 
research,	first,	has	to	clarify	whether	companies	seek	a	fostering	of	public	regulation	and	public	
regulatory capacities, and second, to specify conditions which explain when companies do so. 
While	 this	first	 test	helps	 to	explain	company	motivations	 to	some	extent,	 initial	 interviews	
conducted revealed a number of other explanatory variables. In the following section we pre-
sent some of these variables, which were derived from the empirical samples in an inductive 
way.	These	findings	also	empirically	underpin	the	plausibility	of	a	number	of	hypotheses,	deve-
loped in the wider context of the project.
Emerging prominently, reputation	constitutes	a	main	driver	of	firm	behaviour	as	a	major	intan-




regarding collective regulation, several mechanisms, which are implicitly linked to reputation 
management,	can	be	identified.	They	relate	to	different	drivers	exerting	pressure	on	a	company	
from the perspective of brand protection.
Particularly those companies that maintain a brand name/branded company image or mostly 
sell branded products, which is very often the case in the food & beverages sector, have a strong 
interest in protecting these brand names as one of their key assets. This becomes very obvious 
in the case of Coca-Cola South Africa, which is basically a brand management company and has 
mostly out-sourced or delegated all other aspects of its operations.42 In the mining sector a com-
parable case is probably the diamond producer DeBeers, who is selling diamonds as a branded 
mining product. As a family-owned business the company is largely independent from share-
holder pressures listed companies are exposed to; but still they maintain high CSR standards, 
motivated by brand name protection. Thus, brand name protection has in many cases initiated 
firms	to	pay	more	attention	to	aligning	internal	management	processes	to	CSR	principles.	At	
the same time, they also have a heightened motivation to engage in collective regulation, as 
this allows them to streamline and control the behaviour of other actors, which are conducive 
to maintaining brand credibility. These mechanisms often apply to managing certain actors in 
the supply chain, which cannot be reached via direct supply chain mechanisms. Such conside-
rations are slowly gaining in relevance in the food & beverage sector, while detailed knowledge 
about supply chain contexts is only readily available among the larger companies.
Furthermore, collective regulation might be the strategy of choice in cases where a brand name 
firm	is	faced	with	intense	scrutiny	through	NGO	or	community-based	networks.	In	such	cases,	
42	Interview	 with	 Community	 Affairs	 Manager/Coca-Cola	 South	 Africa,	 Johannesburg,	 South	 Africa,	
26.03.2007.
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brand	name	firms	might	choose	to	enter	into	collective	arrangements	with	these	stakeholder	
groups or seek for other forms of collective regulation in order to control potential reputa-
tional risks from contestation (see Hamann 2004; v. Alstine 2007). In this context, reputation 
management is directly related to the visibility of the individual company. Examples here are 
Nestlé	and	Unilever,	which,	as	multinationals	active	in	South	Africa,	are	among	the	first	targets	
of NGOs when critical issues come up. As a consequence, they have chosen to engage in proac-
tive relations with stakeholder groups. They also maintain such a strategy with government by 
way	of	maintaining	close	relations	to	government	officials	and	following	a	highly	anticipatory	




performance. Especially if listed at stock exchanges outside South Africa, they are subject to 
extensive	reporting	requirements	on	firm	performance	with	regards	to	social,	environmental,	
and also corporate governance aspects44 (Bezuidenhout et al. 2007). Shareholder activism is be-
coming a widespread phenomenon at the world’s most important stock exchanges in New York 
and	London.	The	first	motivation	of	firms	for	seeking	collective	regulation	in	this	context	then	
derives from the necessity to control risks in potentially risk-prone places, such as developing 
and transition countries. This is most probably one of the motivations to seek for collective 
regulation and to actively engage with government for the major players in the food & beverage 
sector.	As	interviewees	noted,	the	perception	of	the	firm	in	the	international	financial	context	
is	of	utmost	importance	and	thus	influences	the	strategy	at	the	country	level,	specifically	the	
interaction with the host government.45
On the other hand, the phenomenon of collective reputation plays a role in the mining in-
dustry. According to an interviewee, the industry is “only as good as the performance of the 
weakest performers”.46	Reputation	in	the	mining	industry	is	not	company	or	brand	specific	but	
a collective issue (Szablowski 2007; Prakash 2005). While smaller companies can free-ride on 






operate, multinational beverage companies have a strong incentive for pushing South African 
43 Interview with Senior Technical Advisor for Safety, Health and Environment/Nestlé South Africa, Jo-
hannesburg, South Africa, 23.03.2007.
44 These requirements are increasingly tightened at the JSE as well.
45	Interview	 with	 Community	 Affairs	 Manager/Coca-Cola	 South	 Africa,	 Johannesburg,	 South	 Africa,	
26.03.2007.
46	Interview	with	Public	Affairs	Manager/AngloGold	Ashanti,	Johannesburg,	South	Africa,	20.03.2007.
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regulation	in	this	field	in	their	preferred	direction	to	avoid	high	adaptation	costs.47 While this 
example	refers	less	to	the	quality	of	the	product	itself,	it	reflects	the	interest	of	multi-nationals	
to achieve technological uniformity across their operations worldwide. Such motivation can 
be explained by factors such as the export orientation	of	a	firm	and	the	home country regulatory 
environmentof	multinational	firms.	Both	factors	capture	a	firm’s	exposure	to	external	regulatory	
standards, which might be higher than in the host country. In cases where such regulations 
affect	firms’	operations	in	host	countries	and	compliance	with	these	will	cause	major	costs	and	
thus	entail	competitive	disadvantages,	firms	may	seek	to	raise	the	standards	in	the	host	country	
accordingly. Firms that produce for markets with higher product standards have an interest to 
promote the introduction of similar standards in the country where they produce, i.e. South 
Africa in our case, in order to avoid competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis those local competitors 
that do not have to comply with these requirements. However, this assumption will only hold 
true	in	cases	where	firms	incur	significant	costs	in	meeting	these	international	standards	and	
if they actually do compete on the host country market as well. New impulses within the food 
sector, which are likely to emphasize the export orientation hypothesis over the years to come, 
are provided by the increasing proliferation of organic food. While South Africa’s target markets 
in	Europe	are	increasingly	demanding	certified	organic	food,	producers	 in	South	Africa	will	
comply on an individual basis until the demand for such products will increase in the domestic 
market as well. In this case, more compliant producers will promote the introduction of stricter 
standards as well.
Following a similar line of argumentation, a high-impact industry, such as mining, has proved 
to be particularly active with regard to voluntary co- and self- regulation. This is not only mo-
tivated by collective reputational concerns but also by the looming threat of external regulation to 
which they are strongly exposed, either at the national, or at the transnational level. Examples 
for	threats	of	regulation	are	sector-specific	programs	in	mining	issued	by	transnational	orga-
nizations, such as the IFC or national governments (e.g. Canada and Australia), or regulation in 
export markets, such as the upcoming REACH regulation of the European Union. The energy 
efficiency	accords	are	also	clearly	motivated	by	the	possible	consideration	of	South	Africa	un-
der the Kyoto protocol in the post 2012-phase.48 MNCs with experience in emission trading 
schemes	and	energy-efficiency	policies	anticipate	similar	regulation	in	South	Africa	and	thus	
follow	an	early	mover	approach	in	this	policy	field.
47	Interview	 with	 Community	 Affairs	 Manager/Coca-Cola	 South	 Africa,	 Johannesburg,	 South	 Africa,	
26.03.2007.
48 Interview with Representative of the Sustainable Futures Unit/NBI, Johannesburg, South Africa, 
19.03.2007.
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gulation and co-regulation in the form of global voluntary CSR norms on the national and local 
regulatory environment in South Africa. These standards trickle down to subsidiaries of MNCs 
through	corporate	governance	mechanisms	within	global	companies.	They	also	influence	pu-
blic	policy	making	in	the	environmental	field.	However,	the	major	mechanism	of	diffusion	into	
public policy is not through an active lobbying and engagement of companies demanding for 
higher standards.
According to our research, there are two dominant drivers in South African industrial envi-
ronmental policy: governmental legislation and global and local proponents of environmental 
standards. The government has been the driving force behind South Africa’s progressive en-
vironmental	 legislation	 in	 the	first	place.	During	 the	political	 transition,	 the	country’s	envi-
ronmental legislation has been pushed by an international epistemic community represented 
through international organizations and NGOs, which went along with initiatives in other po-
licy	fields	used	by	the	ANC	government	to	re-integrate	the	internationally	isolated	country	in	
the international community. 
However, public environmental regulation is constrained in a twofold sense. First, the market-
friendly growth strategy initiated by the current administration to bring about development 
and	the	resulting	dependence	on	FDI	are	in	conflict	with	urgent	demands	for	redistribution,	
social improvement and environmental concerns. This discrepancy has for example become 
evident during the local government elections in 2006 when civil unrest and protests highligh-
ted the lack of public service delivery vis-à-vis a business-friendly macro-economic policies. It 
is	also	reflected	in	the	relative	importance	given	to	the	different	government	departments,	with	
the DWAF and the DEAT usually enjoying less clout than the DMI and the Department of Trade 
and Industry. The second constraint lies in the limited capacity of South African governmental 
actors to implement legislation due to a lack of resources and skills, which is more severe with 
regards to environmental issues than in many other portfolios.
The second driving force are norm setting processes with regard to environmental policies 
in the context of CSR-norms at the transnational level, which are transmitted to the national 
and local level by NGOs and transnational companies. The two levels of regulation, i.e. public 
regulation (with private involvement) and private or public-private co-regulation initiated at 
the transnational level seem often to be disconnected. For the most part, state regulation and 
government-driven public-private co-regulation seem to exist independently from propagated 
CSR activities of companies, resulting in transnational or local multi-stakeholder partnerships 
and the extension of company self-regulation along the production chain or vis-à-vis peers. 
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In the South African context these are rather independent, co-existing regulatory environments 
and	debates	which	come	together	only	randomly	and	thus	do	not	necessarily	influence	each	
other. Both, state regulation and international voluntary standards can be driving forces to raise 
the bar of environmental standards. This, however, requires for companies’ CSR initiatives to 




study, is clearly the active community of non-governmental organisations in South Africa. To-
gether with community-based organisations, NGOs are continuously making a considerable 
contribution to the shaping and implementation of environmental policies, at the national, but 
more	significantly	at	the	local	level.	Faced	with	a	lack	of	capacity	on	the	side	of	government	to	
enforce	legislation	effectively,	civil	society	plays	an	important	role	in	monitoring	the	adherence	
of companies to environmental regulation, thus putting pressure on government and business 
actors alike. In fully understanding the mechanisms shaping environmental policy in South 
Africa, these actors would have to be given more attention than was possible in the context of 
this paper.
The	observation	on	 the	 role	of	 civil	 society	closely	 links	 to	a	number	of	 specific	conditions	
identified	in	this	paper,	under	which	“CSR-companies”	have	an	interest	to	engage	in	collective	
environmental regulation, which might then also lead to a fostering of regulatory capacity, 
applying	the	broader	definition	of	the	concept.	Reputation	concerns	with	regard	to	internatio-
nal	financial	markets	and	NGOs,	firms’	export	markets	as	well	as	the	home	country	regulatory	
environment, looming external regulation and costs incurred due to the absence of a collective 
regulation motivate companies to engage in a fostering of collective regulation. The sector 
structure and the strength of business associations are important explanatory factors. Yet, his-
toric patterns of state-business and business–civil society relations, as expressed e.g. in a low 
level of trust between these actors in South Africa, and the capacity of public actors should also 
be considered in explaining in which scheme of collective regulation companies engage. 
When	looking	to	 the	 further	direction	of	 the	project	as	a	whole,	 in	addition	to	 the	findings	
regarding the role of private actors in shaping environmental policies in South Africa, these 
two factors have emerged, which require further attention in research, as they appear to be of 
particular	relevance	in	the	specific	context	of	transition	countries	and	areas	of	limited	state-
hood	more	generally.	First,	the	role	and	the	level	of	trust	among	different	stakeholders	during	
different	 stages	of	 the	process	 should	be	 considered.	 In	South	Africa,	 there	 is	 an	enormous	
legacy of the apartheid system, which becomes evident not only in material inequalities but 
also in the mindset and habits of people. Following a negotiated transition to democracy, the 
South African government propagated a co-operative government approach, seeking legitimacy 
and capacity through an integration of major societal groups. In the process of establishing a 
sovereign, ANC-lead government in a new democratic South Africa, such co-operation and part-
nership has been faced with obstacles due to deeply rooted mistrust between groups in general 
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and against (white) business in particular. This factor is of relevance once an explanatory model 
will have been developed which will be applied to other countries.
The second factor is the capacity of governments. Whether companies engage in the foste-
ring of state regulatory capacity depends on the very capacity or strength of the state (Börzel 
2007). The weaker the state the more companies may turn to other governance arrangements to 
provide for their needs of collective regulation.49 We therefore assume that depending on the 
capacity of the state to engage with business actors, companies will choose to either consider 
government as a valid counterpart over other solutions or not. Determining how much capacity 
is necessary on the side of the state to successfully engage with business will be, among others, 
subject	to	further	research	efforts.50
49 Jana Hönke’s dissertation analyses patterns of corporate involvement in networks of local security 
governance	against	different	backgrounds	of	statehood.
50 In her dissertation, Nicole Kranz is addressing the interaction of varying levels of state capacity and 
company response in the area of sustainable development.
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